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On numerous occasions, rival firms seek to market goods together.  In some 
cases, they seek to offer complementary products, such as when a toothpaste 
manufacturer offers a promotion with a toothbrush maker.  Yet on other occasions, the 
goods are closer to substitutes, or at least somewhere in between substitutes and 
complements.  Examples include airlines entering into code-sharing agreements, rival 
newspapers offering package advertising rates, and record companies allowing users to 
assemble customized collections of songs from multiple labels.  One arena where joint 
marketing is particularly prevalent is in high-technology industries.  Firms frequently 
commit to jointly make their intellectual property available, for instance through 
commitments to a standard-setting organization or an open source body. 
 
These interactions have attracted relatively little scrutiny from economists.  This 
paper seeks to address this neglect, empirically examining one knowledge-sharing 
institution: the patent pool.  Patent pools can be defined as formal or informal 
organizations where for-profit firms share patent rights with each other and third parties.
1  
A companion paper examines these bodies from a theoretical perspective. 
 
Patent pools are particularly interesting for two reasons.  First, the determinants of 
organizational structure have been a major concern in the industrial organization 
literature for many decades.  While certain hybrids between arm’s length contracting and 
                                                 
1More formally, we define these as cases where either (a) two or more firms combine to 
license patents to third parties (which we term “open” pools) or (b) three or more firms 
come together to license patents to share the patents among themselves ("closed" pools). 
  full integration—e.g., joint ventures—have been extensively scrutinized, patent pools 
represent a little studied organizational structure that may shed light on contracting 
challenges.  The second motivation is a more practical one.  The United States over the 
past two decades has seen an explosion of patent awards, and a dramatic increase in the 
volume of patent litigation between rivals.  Numerous commentators have suggested that 
the proliferation of these awards has had socially detrimental consequences: overlapping 
intellectual property rights may make it difficult for inventors to commercialize new 
innovations.  (Gallini [2002] reviews this literature.)  Patent pools have been proposed by 
Merges [1999], Shapiro [2000], and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Clark, et al. 
[2001]) as a way in which firms can address these “patent thicket” problems.  Indeed, 
patent pools are already an economically significant institution: a recent estimate 
(Clarkson [2003]) suggests that sales in 2001 of devices based in whole or in part on 
poked patents were at least $100 billion.  Were these suggestions to be adopted, their role 
might approach that seen in the early days of 20
th century, when many (if not most) 
important manufacturing industries had a patent pooling arrangement.   
 
After briefly summarizing the history of patent pools, we review the theoretical 
predictions concerning the structure of these pools, some of which are based on the 
framework in Lerner and Tirole [2002].  We then describe the construction of the sample 
of 63 pools established between 1895 and 2001.  The analysis highlights five findings 
consistent with the theoretical predictions: 
•  First, pools involving substitute patents are unlikely to allow pool members to 
license patents independently, consistent with our earlier theoretical work. 
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 •  Second, independent licensing is more frequently allowed when the number of 
members in the pool grows, which may reflect the increasing challenges that 
reconciling users’ differing technological agendas pose in large pools. 
 
•  Third, larger pools are more likely to have centralized control of litigation.  This 
may reflect either the fact that the incentives for individual enforcement in large 
pools are smaller (i.e., because free riding is more intense) or the fact that large 
pools are more likely to include small players with limited enforcement 
capabilities.   
 
•  Fourth, third party licensing is more common in larger pools, consistent with 
suggestions that such pools were established primarily to resolve the bargaining 
difficulties posed by overlapping patent holdings. 
 
•  Finally, during the most recent era, when an intense awareness of antitrust 
concerns precluded many competition-harming patent pools, (a) more important 
patents were selected for pools and (b) patents selected for pools were 
subsequently more intensively referenced by others.   
 
We conclude with a clinical study of a particular patent pool, which in part corroborates 
the large-sample study and in part raises additional questions. 
 
As noted above, there is a very limited amount of related literature.  Priest [1977] 
and Shapiro [2000] represent pioneering attempts to model the rationales for patent pools.  
Bittlingmayer [1988] and Cassady [1959] present clinical studies of single patent pools.  
Gilbert [2002] provides a historical overview of these pools.  Legal scholars, however, 
have written the bulk of the literature on these institutions: Carlson [1999] and Merges 
[1999] are examples.  
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 2.  A Brief History of Patent Pools
2 
The first patent pool is widely agreed to have been established by sewing machine 
manufacturers in 1856.  By the 1890s, pooling agreements had become commonplace in 
the United States. Interest in patent pools stemmed in part from the desire to avoid the 
restrictions on anti-competitive activities that had been enacted as part of the Sherman 
Act of 1890.  Patent pools were seen as exempt from regulatory scrutiny, a perception 
that was buttressed in 1902 when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to invalidate a patent 
pool, noting “the general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of patent rights under 
the patent laws of the United States.  The very object of these laws is monopoly….”
3  
 
 Soon thereafter, however, the tide began to shift.  The Supreme Court struck 
down the bathtub enameling patent pool in 1912 in the Standard Sanitary decision.  
Private antitrust litigation regarding pools increased sharply thereafter.  Government 
efforts to investigate and break up pools accelerated after well-publicized hearings on 
patent pools in the late 1930s.  (This period also saw a more general increase in antitrust 
enforcement, as discussed in Ghosal and Gallo [2001].)  The Supreme Court decision in 
the Hartford-Empire case, in which Justice Hugo Black pronounced “the history of this 
country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny 
over any field of industry than that accomplished by [the pool members],”
4 was widely 
seen as ushering in an era of regulatory intolerance for these arrangements.  As a 
                                                 
2This section is based on Carlson [1999], Merges [1999], and Vaughn [1925, 1956]. 
 
3E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Company, 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902). 
 
4Hartford Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386, 436-437 (1945). 
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 consequence, the number of new patent pools formed in the United States dwindled away 
to almost nothing after World War II. 
 
In recent years, however, there has been a cautious revival.   In 1995, the U.S. 
Department of Justice and U.S. Federal Trade Commission issued its “Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,” which explicitly noted, “cross-
licensing and pooling arrangements may provide pro-competitive benefits.”
5  Shortly 
thereafter, Justice’s Antitrust Division issued a favorable review letter concerning the 
MPEG-2 Video patent pool.  The result has been a modest resurgence of these 
arrangements. Numerous steps have been taken by the designers of these pools to avoid 
antitrust scrutiny, including in many cases the submission of the pooling agreement to the 
Antitrust Division for advance approval.  
 
3. Theoretical  Perspectives 
In the companion work to this one (Lerner and Tirole [2002]), we present a 
theoretical treatment of rationales for and consequences of patent pooling agreements.
6  
This section is not intended to duplicate that paper.  Rather, it seeks to highlight several 
key insights based on that framework regarding the structure of patent pools. 
 
                                                 
5http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (accessed March 19, 2002). 
 
6The focus of the theory paper is on normative issues relating to antitrust policy.   
Nonetheless, the framework leads to a number of positive insights.  In this paper, we 
complement the earlier analysis with some additional theoretical points. 
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 We focus here on four characteristics of the patent pools.  The first of these is 
whether the pool allows its members to engage in independent licensing (i.e., not as part 
of the pool).  Lerner and Tirole [2002] show that the requirement that independent 
licenses be offered is a perfect screening device when—as is often the case—the antitrust 
authorities are poorly informed as to whether the patents in the pool are substitutes or 
complements.  For welfare-decreasing pools (which we will refer to as “pools with 
substitute patents” for short
7), the requirement that independent licenses be offered 
returns the outcome to what it would have been in the absence of a pool.  For welfare-
increasing pools (“pools with complementary patents”), the requirement that independent 
licensing be permitted has no impact.  The theory thus predicts that in the absence of 
strong antitrust enforcement, patent pools should allow independent licensing precisely 
when it is innocuous, that is, when patents are complements.  (All things being equal, we 
believe that firms would allow independent licensing, since it would help assuage the 
concerns of antitrust authorities, particularly in the most recent years.)  Pools between 
substitutes would be likely to prohibit such licensing, due to its negative impact on pool 
and member profits. 
 
We also expect that independent licensing will be more common in large pools, 
though the strength of our conclusions must be tempered.  If a large number of patents 
are included in the pool, licensors are only likely to be interested in a subset of the 
patents.  Independent licensing allows this problem to be addressed.  To be sure, pools do 
                                                 
7We use this terminology, even though the change in the sign of the welfare impact does 
not coincide with the switch from “complements” to “substitutes” (using the definitions 
standard in demand theory).  It is correct to say, though, that the more substitutable the 
patents in the pool are, the more likely it is that the pool will reduce welfare.  
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 not need to allow independent licensing in order to let licensors select which patents meet 
their needs.  Alternatively, they could offer “menus,” or subsets of patents to license.  
One of the surprises we encountered in the data collection phase was how few pools 
(11% of the entire sample) offered menus.  As the case study discussed in Section 6 
highlights, transaction costs, disagreements over how to price items on the menu, and 
disputes over the sharing of licensing fees all served to discourage the use of menus.  
Such potential disagreements may make independent licensing an attractive substitute for 
menus. 
 
The second characteristic of the pools we consider is whether control of litigation 
is centralized.  Initially, it might be thought that it would always make sense to assign 
control over enforcement activities to the original patent-owners: after all, they should be 
better informed about their patents than anyone else.  But the choice as to whether to 
control litigation centrally is driven by two considerations: capabilities and externalities. 
 
On the capabilities front, the abilities of firms to detect infringements and manage 
patent litigation cases are likely to vary drastically.  In particular, small firms without 
large patent portfolios are unlikely to have experienced lawyers specializing in 
intellectual property issues.  These limited capabilities mean that centralized enforcement 
is advantageous.  Pools with many members may be more likely to have firms without 
the capacity to litigate. 
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 The choice of whether to centralize the control of litigation is also driven by the 
presence of externalities among the members.  Each member, under decentralized 
enforcement, considers its own welfare, but not that of other participants.  In the absence 
of independent licensing, each firm only receives 1/n
th of the pool’s proceeds from its 
expenditures on enforcement.  We would expect this “free-rider problem,” and the 
consequent reduced investment in enforcement, to be most severe when there are many 
firms in the patent pool. 
 
Independent licensing reduces this free-rider rider problem, as royalties on 
individual patents are then only partially shared.  Thus, independent licensing should 
work against centralization.  Note, though, that although this effect is clear, its strength 
may be limited if—as theory predicts and will be verified empirically—independent 
licensing is mainly present when patents are complements.  Thus, the use of independent 
licensing will be limited, and it will only be able to partially mitigate the free-rider 
problem. 
 
We should note that pool members’ attitudes towards the reduced litigation 
resulting from decentralized control might vary.  Suppose, for instance, that members are 
allowed to license their patents independently.  If patents are substitutes (an unlikely 
case, as we argued above), then the under-investment in litigation leads to negative 
consequences for the pool.  When the patents are complements, however, the absence of 
litigation may actually help the other pool members: the lower price that a pool member 
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 who fails to litigate his patents or his infringer charges may lead to increased demand for 
the other, independently licensed patents. 
 
Pools are more likely to grant licenses to third parties if the latter are downstream 
suppliers of products not offered by the pool members or (even better) complements to 
the pool’s products.  Unfortunately, we do not observe the extent to which the pool 
members have a presence in the downstream product markets. 
 
It is also difficult for us to predict whether pools consisting of patents that are 
substitutes or complements with each other are more likely to offer licenses to third 
parties.   Owners of intellectual property can enter into patent pools for a number of 
reasons.  These different motivations are likely to lead to very different choices.  One 
rationale for entering into a patent pool is to facilitate collusion.  Firms may enter into 
such agreements to reduce the degree of competition with their peers.  In product market 
cartels, the pool may serve as a mechanism to extract greater profits from the downstream 
market.  By combining patents that are substitutes and licensing them as a package, firms 
may be able to charge higher royalties for the usage of the technology.  A more benign 
alternative is that firms enter into patent pools to solve the “patent thicket” problem: the 
presence of overlapping intellectual property holdings that make it difficult for third 
parties to license patent holdings and develop new technologies.  Such pools, unlike the 
ones discussed above, have the potential to enhance social welfare. 
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 Similarly, it is difficult for us to anticipate the impact of pool size.  One 
conjecture is that small pools may lack the capability for downstream production, while 
larger pools have such a capability.  Larger pools may thus be less likely to grant licenses 
to third parties.  As we’ll see once we turn to the data, however, fully 98% of the pool 
members have the option to make use of the patents included in the pool, so the 
conjectured effect is unlikely to be a strong one.
8  Alternatively, it may be possible that 
the motivation for forming the larger pools is that key patents are more widely distributed 
across firms.  If the motivation for such pools is to address “patent thicket” problems, 
then third party licensing may be more common in these settings. 
 
  Finally, we examine the innovation friendliness of the pools: the extent to which 
features of the pool encourage or deter future innovation by the pool members.  Pools 
encourage innovation by their members by allowing them to keep the rights to the 
intellectual property that they discover after the pool is formed.
9  By requiring these 
awards to be assigned to the patent pool, the incentive to innovate is dulled.  It should be 
noted that however undesirable the reduced incentives to innovate are from a social 
perspective, this consequence may not be worrisome for pool members: firms may seek 
to boost their profits by “softening” their competition in the R&D market in this manner.  
But innovation unfriendly terms also play a more benign role.  By adopting such a clause, 
the pool members protect themselves from hold-up problems by one of their 
                                                 
8It is not clear that that the firms exercised this option in every case; this term’s 
prevalence may reflect the very low cost of adding such a provision to an agreement. 
 
9See Lerner and Tirole [2002] for a more general analysis of the determinants of 
innovation friendliness. 
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 opportunistic peers.  By requiring automatic licensing, the potential problem that a pool 
member may make an essential discovery and then demand an extraordinary sum from 
the other members for access to the technology is defused.   
 
The impact of the rate of technological progress on the decision to make a pool 
innovation friendly is ambiguous.  If rapid technological progress characterizes an 
industry, the possibility of a radical innovation that would make opportunistic behavior 
possible is greater.  This concern argues for the adoption of provisions that require the 
assignment of future patents, even if they reduce the incentives to innovate.  At the same 
time, the dangers associated with the reduced incentives to innovate may be the greatest 
here: another firm outside the pool may be more likely to make a discovery that 
“leapfrogs” (obsoletes) the technology of the pool members.  Thus, a faster rate of 
innovation in the industry increases both the costs and benefits of innovation friendliness.  
 
The consequences of being leapfrogged are particularly severe if the main aim of 
the pool is to license its technology to third parties.  (By way of contrast, pool members 
combining patents for their own use may welcome some external competition.)  Hence, 
we would expect innovation friendliness to be positively associated with licensing to 
third parties, particularly when the patents included in the pool are complements. 
 
  Another set of predictions relate to the recent set of pools, almost all of which 
have been extensively scrutinized by the U.S. Department of Justice for possible 
detrimental impacts on competition.  Even in the recent pools not submitted to the 
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 Department for review, pool members—seeking to deter antitrust scrutiny—have 
typically hired outside experts to ascertain that the patents are truly essential (that is, 
complementary).  It might be thought that in these pools, we would see two effects at 
work: 
•  The quality of the patents included in the pools would be higher, reflecting the 
screening of potential patents. 
 
•  Since in these cases, the pools are especially likely to enhance usage of the 
patents by third parties, the patents included in these pools should be more heavily 
employed by others. 
 
We will test these suggestions using the various measures of patent quality found in the 
earlier literature (e.g., using patent citations as a proxy for utilization). 
 
4.  Constructing the Sample 
The literature on patent pools to date—which, as noted above, has been largely 
confined to law reviews—focuses on the reported judicial decisions on these 
arrangements.  While the decisions discuss aspects of the pools’ structure, they do not 
provide sufficient details to allow a systematic analysis of the features of the pools.  In 
order to test the theory delineated above, we needed the actual agreements governing the 
patent pools.  This section describes the procedure we employed to construct the patent 
pool sample, as well as the supplemental data used in the analysis.  
 
A. Identifying the Pools 
The first question was one of definition.  Our definition of patent pools in 
footnote 1 excludes several other types of arrangements: 
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 •  Simple cross-license arrangements between two firms, where there was no clearly 
stated intention of engaging in future licensing transactions.   
 
•  New operating companies that were established to manufacture products based on 
intellectual property of a number of firms (e.g., Radio Corporation of America). 
 
•  Firms that acquired large amounts of patents and then licensed them to other 
concerns (e.g., American Steel and Wire Company, American Tobacco Company, 
and other “patent consolidators”). 
 
•  Pools that are dominated by non-profit entities (e.g., universities), where profit-
maximizing considerations may not be paramount. 
 
We then compiled a list of all identifiable patent pools.  The primary sources for 
these identifications were Carlson [1999], Commerce Clearing House [various years], 
Kaysen and Turner [1959], Merges [1999], Vaughn [1925, 1956], and “War and Peace” 
[1942], though many other sources were used as well.  In total, we identified 
approximately 125 patent pools, dating between 1856 and 2001.  (In some cases, we were 
unsure based on the information that we could collect whether the arrangement satisfied 
our definition of a pool.) 
 
These pools appear not to have been disclosed by firms in filings with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  Instead, we obtained the pooling agreements in 
five ways: 
•  Congressional hearings during the 1930s and 1940s scrutinized a number of 
patent pools (especially U.S. Congress [1938-1940], U.S. House [1935], U.S. 
Senate [1942]).  In many cases, the pooling agreements were either published in 
the records of the hearings or else retained as unpublished exhibits (which are 
preserved in the committees’ files in the National Archives in Washington, D.C.) 
 
•  Many of the pools were subjects of private or federal antitrust litigation.  In the 
course of the trials, frequently the patent pooling agreements were entered as 
exhibits.  The dockets of these cases are preserved in the various regional 
depositories of the National Archives.  In order to limit costs, we focused on those 
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 depositories with the greatest concentration of cases: Boston (which has records 
from federal district cases in the first judicial circuit), Chicago (which includes 
much of the sixth and seventh circuits, as well as some of the ninth circuit), 
Kansas City (which has records from parts of the eighth and tenth circuits, as well 
as older records from parts of the second and third circuit), and New York City 
(which has more recent records from parts of the second and third circuits).   
 
•  The Antitrust Division of U.S. Department of Justice investigated a number of 
patent pools, some of which were litigated against and others were not.  Since the 
time these files were used by Hay and Kelley [1974], the records have been 
transferred to the National Archives’ Suitland, Maryland facility.  These files 
were located with the assistance of Johnson [1981].  As part of the investigations, 
the patent pooling agreements were sometimes gathered and preserved.  
 
•  The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission have 
scrutinized a number of the recent pools.  In these cases, we obtained the key 
documents through Freedom of Information Act requests. 
 
•  In the case of recent pools that had not been the subject of federal scrutiny, we 
requested the documents from the pool administrators. 
 
In all, we were able to collect the documentation on 63 patent pools.
10  We then identified 
and coded the key characteristics of the agreements.  We focused on the initial agreement 
establishing the pool, rather than the many amendments that frequently characterize these 
agreements. 
 
Given the lack of a systematized database of patent pools, it is difficult to assess 
the comprehensiveness of our sample.  At the same time, it is reassuring that the 
distribution of the 63 pools, summarized in Table 1 and 2, reflects the patterns discussed 
in Section 2.  We believe it is likely that the sample underrepresents the very oldest 
pools: the federal government was far less active in antitrust enforcement during this 
                                                 
10We have not identified any non-U.S. government sources for patent pool agreements 
(though our sample does include some agreements exclusively between firms outside the 
United States).  Antitrust authorities outside the U.S. historically do not appear to have 
systematically reviewed or litigated patent pooling arrangements until recent years. 
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 period, and many of district court files from this period are lost or unusable.  In addition, 
it may be that pools involving German firms are disproportionately represented, since ties 
between German and American firms were a particular focus of the Bone Committee’s 
hearings in 1942.   
 
B. Supplemental Information 
We next collected a variety of information on each of these pools.  One important 
variable in our analysis was patenting activity in the industry of the patent pool in the five 
years prior to the establishment of the pool.  To undertake this analysis, we first 
determined which patent subclasses using today’s classification scheme the patent pool 
covered.  (The patent classification scheme is periodically updated as new technologies 
emerge.)  These subclasses were identified in two ways.  First, we examined the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) Manual of Classification (available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspcindex/indextouspc.htm), which details the 
U.S. patent classification scheme.  Second, we determined the patents that were included 
in the pool from the pooling agreements.  These were determined from the agreements 
themselves and USPTO indexes.  We ascertained the subclasses into which the patents 
are assigned today using the database available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/search-
adv.html.  We then determined how many patents were assigned to these subclasses 
(whether included in the pool or not) in the years before the establishment of the pool 
using the latter database.  We also computed two alternative measures: the overall growth 
in patenting by pool members and the patenting by members in the subclass covered by 
the patent pool.  A detailed index to U.S. patent awards by firm is available in electronic 
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 format only after the early 1970s.  To identify patenting by firms for the older pools, we 
used the USPTO’s annual Index of Patents Issued by the Commissioner of Patents and its 
predecessor publications.   
 
We also collected several other measures, which we used in supplemental 
regressions not reported in the paper: 
•  The revenues of pool members in the five years prior to the establishment of the 
pool.  For recent pools, we employed the data in Compustat and WorldScope 
databases.  For older pools, we relied on information in the Moody’s Industrial 
Manuals, which list both U.S. and major foreign firms, and various non-U.S. 
national corporate directories.  In some cases, we were able to determine from the 
publication another measure of financial performance (e.g., the firm’s operating 
profits or net income), but not the firm’s revenues.  In these cases, we used the 
median ratio between this measure and the revenues for other firms in the industry 
during the same year (also determined from the Moody’s manual) to impute the 
revenue.  We were not able to determine any financial information, however, for 
approximately one-third of the firms.   
 
•  The median book-to-market ratio for firms in the industry of the patent pool in the 
year prior to the establishment of the pool.  This ratio, which is frequently used as 
a proxy for growth prospects, was determined for recent pools using the 
Compustat and the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) databases.  
For the pools established prior to the 1970s, we employed market value data from 
the CRSP database and the book value data collected from Moody’s manuals by 
Davis, Fama, and French [2000].  Because valuation levels shift dramatically over 
this period, we adjust the median industry book-to-market ratio by subtracting 




                                                 
11This data set only extends as far back as 1926, so we do not have this measure for 
earlier patent pools. 
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 C.  Additional Data for the Most Recent Pools 
As noted above, we intensively study five patent pools
12 formed in 1995 and after.  
We elected to focus on recent pools for two reasons.  First, as noted above, there was a 
strong rationale for believing that these pools would be consistently innovation and 
efficiency enhancing, as opposed to those from earlier periods, where considerable 
diversity characterized the population of pools.
13  Second, the U.S. patents in these pools 
could be analyzed using the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent 
Citations Data File constructed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001].  (Detailed 
information about U.S. patents awarded before the 1970s are not available in any 
electronic database.) 
 
Upon identifying the pooled patents, we proceeded to form two sets of matching 
patents: 
•  The first of these matching sets included the patents awarded to the same firms 
that were most proximate to the pooled patent. (We defined the most proximate 
patent as the one with the closest award number.)
14   
 
•  The second of these matching patents was the most proximate patents awarded to 
the same type of assignee as the pooled patents and within the same USPTO 
                                                 
12The pools whose patents were analyzed included the two DVD, MPEG-2, 1394, and 
DVB-T associations. Though we had the pooling agreements for two additional recent 
patent pools, the Bluetooth and 3G organizations, these documents did not include data 
on which patents had been assigned to these pools.  Thus, we could not use these two 
pools in the patent analysis. 
 
13While antitrust officials are unlikely to always know whether the patents in the pools are 
substitutes or complements, the use of external reviewers to determine essential patents 
and (as we argue in Lerner and Tirole [2002]) the presence of independent licensing 
requirements help insure that these recent pools are innovation and efficiency enhancing. 
  
14We were not able to assign a matching patent based on this criterion for one pooled 
patent because the assignee did not own any patents other than the patents included in the 
pool. 
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 technology class. We relied upon the assignee type field in the NBER patent 
database to determine whether each patent was assigned to a government, non-
government organization (mostly corporations), or an individual, and whether the 
patent was assigned to a U.S. or non-U.S. entity. 
 
When the matching patent coincided with a patent that was included in a pool or with a 
patent that was already selected as a matching patent, then the next most proximate patent 
was selected as the matching patent. In cases where the matching patent for a given 
pooled patent based on the same-firm criteria was the same as the matching patent based 
on the same-class criteria, we found a new same-class match for the patent, choosing the 
second most proximate award.  
 
In the majority of cases, the award date of the matching patents was the same as 
the award date of the pooled patent. The mean of the absolute number of days between 
the pooled patent and the matched patent based on the same-firm criteria was 37.3 days 
and the median was 0.0. The mean absolute number of days between the pooled patent 




We proceed in two parts.  First, using the patent pools established before 1995, 
we examine the determinants of the characteristics of these agreements.  We then focus 
on the most recent pools, and exploit our more detailed data on these organizations. 
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 A.  Analyses of Pool Characteristics  
Our first approach is to examine the univariate relationships.  Table 3 presents an 
initial tabulation of the four dependent variables we will examine, as well as the three 
independent variables discussed above. 
 
While such an analysis can only scratch the surface—we do not consider the 
relationships between the dependent variables or the interaction effects discussed 
above—a few patterns stand out.  First, a secular trend appears to be at work.   
Independent licensing provisions are more common in later pools, while the centralized 
control over litigation has become less so.  Second, pool size appears to matter.  Larger 
pools are associated with a greater probability of independent licensing, consistent with 
theoretical suggestions above.  
 
We then seek to estimate a formal model.  Following the discussion in Section 3 
above, we hypothesize the following relationships: 
indivlic = a + b×firmcount + c×substitute + ε1 
 
litigcentral = d + e×firmcount + f×firmcount×licto3rd×(1-indivlic) + g×indivlic + 
h×substitute×indivlic + ε2 
 
licto3rd = i + j×firmcount + k×substitute + ε3 
 
innovfr = l + m×licto3rd + n×(1-substitute)×licto3rd + o×growth + ε4 
 
These equations had three sets of variables, which we will discuss in turn. 
 
There were four limited dependent variables.  Indivlic, licto3rd, and innovfr take 
on value one if the pool allows independent licensing by pool members, allows licensing 
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 to third parties, and does not require pool members to automatically assign discoveries to 
the pool.  Litigcentral takes on the value of one if litigation is controlled by each firm 
acting on its own; three if the pool is in control of the litigation with no provision for opt-
out; and two in the intermediate cases.  Simultaneous estimation is necessary because 
some limited dependent variables appear on the right-hand side of the equations. 
 
The exogenous independent variables included the count of the number of parties 
in the pool (firmcount) and the growth of patenting in the industry segment of the pool in 
the five years prior to the pool’s formation (growth).  Because we believe that there will 
be substantial non-linearities with firm size (e.g., the coordination challenges may be 
very different in a pool with two members and one with six members, but not differ 
appreciably between ones with ten and thirty members), we winsorize the firm count 
variable.  Firmcount is top-coded at six.  In robustness checks discussed below, we use 
alternative measures for the count of the firm members and for growth.     
 
The variable substitute takes on the value one if the patents in the pool are pure 
substitutes, zero if they are entirely complements, or else takes on an intermediate value 
in this range.  Because we do not observe the degree of substitutability, we estimate this 
as a latent variable, using the following fifth equation: 
substitute = p + q×y45bef + r×royaltyfreemem×(1-licto3rd) + s×notgilbertcase + 
ε5 
 
The independent variables are measures that we expect will be associated with the degree 
of substitutability or complementarity of the patents in the pool.  Y45bef indicates pools 
formed before the Hartford-Empire decision of 1945; royaltyfreemem  denotes pools 
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 where the members used the patents in the pool on a royalty free basis; and 
notgilbertcase denotes pools other than those identified by Gilbert [2002] as ones where 
the courts identified the pool as anti-competitive in intent.  Only the rationale for the 
second item probably needs discussion.  We hypothesized that in cases where pool 
members were free to use patents on a royalty free basis and the pool did not license them 
to third parties, it was less likely that the decision to establish the pool was driven by 
anticompetitive motivations (and the patents were less likely to be substitutes).   
 
 
The five equations are estimated simultaneously following the approaches 
delineated in the discrete choice literature. Heckman [1978] discusses the issues of 
identification and estimation in this setting.  Schmidt [1981] provides the necessary and 




More specifically, each limited dependent variable, y, is associated with a latent 
variable, y*, that follows a normal distribution: 
Prob(y = i) = Prob(zi-1 < y* < zi) 
 
The set of parameters includes {a,…, o, q,…, r} and the threshold parameters {zi}.  The 
scaling constant p is used to enforce the constraint that the latent variable substitute falls 
between 0 and 1.  As a result, p is not a well-identified parameter to be estimated in the 
analysis. The estimates are obtained by numerically maximizing the log likelihood 
function. The standard errors of the estimates are calculated from the inverse of the 
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 Fisher information matrix. The numerical second derivative of the log likelihood function 
is used as in Hamilton [1994].  
 
The intensive reviews of the draft patent pool agreements by U.S. Department of 
Justice officials in 1995 and thereafter may have resulted in fundamentally different 
dynamics behind these agreements.  Reflecting this concern, our analysis is restricted to 
pools established prior to 1995.   
 
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 4.  The following results 
stood out from the analyses: 
•  Pools involving substitute patents are unlikely to allow pool a member to license 
patents independently, consistent with our earlier theoretical work. 
 
•  Independent licensing is more frequently allowed when the number of members 
in the pool grows, which may reflect the increasing challenges associated with 
reconciling users’ differing technological agendas in large pools.   
 
•  Larger pools are more likely to have centralized control of litigation.  As noted 
above, this may reflect either the fact that the incentives for individual 
enforcement in large pools are smaller (i.e., because free riding is more intense) or 
the fact that large pools are more likely to include small players with limited 
enforcement capability.  The former hypothesis had suggested that the interaction 
between the count of firms in the pool and the absence of independent licensing 
would have particular explanatory power, but this coefficient proves to be 
insignificant and of the opposite sign.   
 
•  Suggestive, though statistically insignificant, results emerge from the relationship 
between the centralized control of litigation and independent licensing.  As 
predicted above, independent licensing is associated with a lower probability of 
centralized control of litigation.  
 
•  We had few unambiguous predictions regarding the determinants of patents being 
licensed to third parties.  We find that third party licensing is more common in 
larger pools, which is consistent with suggestions that such pools were established 
primarily to resolve the bargaining difficulties posed by overlapping patent 
holdings. 
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Again, the analysis of innovation friendliness produces suggestive, if statistically 
insignificant results.  Innovation friendly terms are associated with pools where 




The estimated latent variable regressions generate one statistically significant 
result consistent with our priors: pools identified by Gilbert [2002] as particularly 
problematic are more likely to contain substitutes.  The greater probability of 
pools formed prior to 1945 having substitute patents, while statistically 
insignificant, is also consistent with our priors. 
 
While our ability to examine the robustness of the results was limited by the small 
sample size and the modest number of details on the pool members that we were able to 
ascertain, in unreported regressions we undertook a variety of supplemental analyses.  
We employ alternative dependent and independent variables (for instance, coding 
litigcentral as a binary measure like the others and no longer winsorizing firmcount).  We 
substitute the alternative variables measuring growth (growth in pool members’ sales and 
patenting) for growth in overall industry patenting.  The results delineated above continue 
to come through, though the significance of the firmcount measure is frequently lower 
when the full measure is used, due to the heavy influence of a few very large pools. 
 
Another set of robustness checks examined the possibility of selection biases.  As 
acknowledged above, our sample was not a random one: the pools included in the 
analysis were disproportionately likely to have been litigated.  These pools might 
reasonably be thought to have characteristics (e.g., anti-competitive provisions) not 
shared by the others.  To address this concern, we examined the subset of historical pools 
that were identified through means other than litigation records: those revealed in the 
course of congressional hearings.  The criteria used to select pools for scrutiny by 
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 Congress were quite different: for instance, a number of hearings systematically 
examined all active pools in certain industries (e.g., dyestuffs, petroleum, and precious 
metals) or involving firms of a given nation (Germany). 
 
We repeated the above analyses, using this sub-sample.  Because of the smaller 
sample size, we did not estimate the full set of equations, but rather single equations or 
sets of two equations.  The magnitude of the effects continued to be similar, though the 
statistical significance was more modest in some cases (reflecting the smaller sample 
size).   
 
A third concern related to the presence of omitted variable biases.  We were 
worried that our results could stem from the fact that variables such as firmcount might 
be correlated with important omitted measures, such as the degree to which the members 
of the pool dominated the upstream or downstream product markets.  While we could not 
thoroughly address this concern, we did explore the robustness of the results to 
specifications with additional independent variables.  These results were generally 
consistent, though significance levels did vary. 
 
B.  Analysis of Pool Performance 
We then examined the relative importance of the patents that were included in the 
recent pools, as well as the effects of selection into these pools on the usage of these 
patents.  We focus our analysis on the most recent period when, as noted above, patent 
pools were subject to extensive antitrust scrutiny.  Consistent with theoretical suggestions 
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 above, pools appear to have higher-quality patents and the inclusion in the pool seemed 
to trigger more utilization. 
 
Table 5 provides a look at the differences between pooled patents and their 
counterparts. In Panel A, we focus upon a measure of the importance: patent citations 
received. A patent that receives more citations is generally viewed as being more 
important than a patent with fewer citations (see, for instance, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
[2002]).  We divided the number of citations to each patent into two components: the 
citations received before the pool was formed and those received afterwards. 
 
In order to count the number of citations a patent received before and after the 
pool was formed, we used the NBER Patent Citation Data File.  We were able to identify 
all of the patents that cited patents in our sample through the end of 1999. Once we 
identified these patents, we used the grant date of each citing patent to determine if it was 
awarded before or after the formation of a given pool. For the matching patents, we 
similarly examined the number of citations prior to and after the formation of the pool in 
which the corresponding pooled patent was included.   
 
The number of citations received before the pool was formed served as a measure 
of the importance of a patent that can reasonably be assumed to be unaffected by its 
inclusion in a pool. The number of citations received after the pool was formed reflects 
factors such as the intrinsic significance of the patent, the increased attention received 
due to its inclusion in the pool, and potentially the decreased concerns about blocking 
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 patent issues that arise in follow-on innovations.  In Panel A of Table 5, we compare the 
average annual number of citations before and after the pools’ formation.  Tests of the 
equality of means and medians reveal that the number of citations received before and 
after pool formation are both significantly higher for pooled patents relative to the 
matching patents. These results suggest that the patents included in the pools were 
relatively more important. 
 
Figure 1 and 2 provide a graphical look at the number of citations received by 
year.  In the first graph, we present the annual citation rate relative to the year of the 
award: e.g., we depict the citations per patent in the sample in the year after the award.  
Consistently, those patents that are included in the pools are more intensively cited.  In 
the second, the citations are presented relative to the year of pool formation. The figure 
reveals that while patents in the pool are more intensively cited than their peers, the 
difference is confined to the years immediately before the pools’ formation and the years 
subsequent to the pools’ establishment. 
  
In Panel B and Panel C of Table 5, we look at differences in “originality” and 
“generality” respectively between patents included in pools and the matching sets. We 
use the measures of originality and generality employed by Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002], 
where generality/originality is defined as one minus the sum of the squared percentage of 
citations received/made from each patent class. Originality is a proxy for the 
innovativeness of patents because patents citing patents from a more diverse set of 
classes can be thought of as linking innovations from a broader set of domains. Panel B 
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 indicates that the originality of the pooled patents is not significantly different from the 
originality of the matching sets. 
 
Generality is also related to the economic value of a patent. Patents cited by 
patents from a wider set of classes tend to be more valuable because they form the basis 
for follow-on innovations in a larger set of fields. Panel C reveals that the generality of 
the pooled patents is significantly higher than the generality of the matching patents. This 
suggests that either the patents being included in pools have the potential to be leveraged 
in a wider variety of domains or the effect of being included in the pools results in their 
broader utilization. 
 
In Panel D, we utilize the number of claims made by a patent as a proxy for the 
scope of a patent. Patents that make more claims tend to be broader and therefore more 
valuable. For both matching sets in Panel D, the Wilcoxon median test yields a smaller p-
value than the t-test. This difference can be attributed to the skewness in the distribution 
of the number of claims made by patents. The results of the Wilcoxon median test are 
probably more relevant because of the weaker distributional assumptions made by this 
test.
15  Employing the set of matching patents by class and by firm, the Wilcoxon median 
test indicates that the number of claims made by pooled patents is significantly higher 
than non-pooled patents at the 10% level of significance. Restricting the set of matching 
patents to matches by firm yields similar results. 
                                                 
15The Wilcoxon median test simply assumes that the two sets come from populations with 
the same distribution without imposing restrictions on what this shape may be. 
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We then seek to perform similar analyses of the characteristics of pooled patents in 
a multivariate framework. We employed the same sets of matching patents as above to 
construct our sample. The dependent variables we used in these analyses are the same 
measures of patent characteristics as used above: citations received, originality, generality, 
and claims made.  
 
In Table 6, we explore the importance of patents as measured by citations received.  
We use as the dependent variable the number of citations received in each year after the 
award.  As in the univariate analysis, we employed this strategy to address the concern that 
once a patent is included in a pool, it will receive more citations due its exposure and its 
availability on established licensing terms.  We employ several specifications, in the style 
of Furman and Stern [2002].   First, we simply estimated ordinary least squares 
regressions, with dummy variables controlling for the year of the patent award, the vintage 
of the patent (that is, the number of years between the award and the observation), and 
each matched set of patents (the pooled patent and the two matching ones).  The patents in 
the pool are more frequently cited in general, but particularly after the establishment of the 
pool. 
 
Due to the discrete nature of the number of citations received, we also ran a set of 
regressions using a negative binomial specification.  We again employed a dummy 
variable for each group of patents, and also estimated the equation with a distinct dummy 
variable for each patent.  Once again, patents included in pools were more frequently cited 
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 in general, and especially after their inclusion in a pool (an effect that was particularly 
strong in the latter specification).
16 
 
We employed only one observation for each patent in the regressions analyzing 
originality, generality, and the number of claims reported in Table 7.  As control variables, 
we employed dummy variables for the year in which a patent was granted, the pool in 
which the patent was included (the pool of the corresponding pooled patent in the case of 
matching patents), and the category of the patent as defined in the NBER patent database.
17  
The results are also consistent with the univariate comparisons in Table 5. Across the 
specifications, generality is highly significant while originality is not.  These regressions 
suggest that pooled patents tend to have a broader range of applications but do not 
integrate a broader set of innovations.  The last regression reveals that the number of 
claims made by pooled patents is not significantly greater than the number of claims made 
by non-pooled patents.  
 
                                                 
16We repeat the regression analyses, adding a dummy variable for patents that would be 
added to a pool in the next one-to-three years (as well as an interaction term as above).  
This interaction term is also positive and significant across the regressions.  Even after 
we control for the greater propensity to cite both patents that are already in pools and 
those that are soon to be added to pools, the coefficient on the variable denoting patents 
that are included in pools is consistently positive and significant.  In other words, the 
tendency to cite pooled patents more frequently is not confined to the periods 
immediately before and after they are included in a pool.   
 
17These categories are Chemical (excluding drugs), Computers and Communications, 
Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronics, Mechanical, and Other. 
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 6.  Field Research  
To gain a richer understanding of the forces shaping patent pooling agreements, 
we supplemented our theoretical and large-sample research with a case study of the 
MPEG-2 patent pool.
18   MPEG-2 is a digital video compression standard used in 
products including DVD and high definition television. The standard was developed by 
the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) under the leadership of Leonardo 
Chiariglione, along with scientists and engineers from many universities and 
corporations.  The standard setting effort began in the July 1990 and the final MPEG-2 
standard was approved in November 1994.  During the completion of the standard setting 
process, intellectual property issues became a paramount concern. While all participants 
in the standard setting process signed a letter of assurance of fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory (RAND) licensing, concerns lingered due to the large number of 
patents required to implement the standard.  Even if each individual patentholder licensed 
their patents on reasonable terms, Chiariglione and other participants were concerned that 
the sum of all such licenses might not be reasonable.
19  
 
                                                 
18This section is based on interviews with current and former employees from five 
different organizations that participated in or negotiated with the pool. In addition, we 
spoke with Leonardo Chiariglione, Vice President, Multimedia at Telecom Italia Lab, the 
research center of Telecom Italia.  Finally, we spoke with a representative from MPEG 
LA, the corporate entity formed to administrate the pool. 
 
19It should be noted that considerable ambiguity surrounds the definition of what 
constitutes RAND licensing.  A number of standard-setting bodies we talked to were 
unable to provide a precise definition of what constituted a reasonable royalty.  For 
instance, one group indicated that they used 5% as an upper bound, but did not 
distinguish between cases where the rate applied to the individual component and the 
entire system. 
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 The MPEG Intellectual Property Rights Working Group was thus formed in 1993 
to develop a unified approach to MPEG-2 licensing. As the standard materialized, this 
task was led by CableLabs, an R&D consortium for the cable industry formed in the late 
1980s when there was little compatibility among cable systems in the U.S.  CableLabs 
was an active participant in the MPEG-2 standard setting process with the goal of making 
sure that the resulting standard was consistent with their needs.  Baryn Futa, executive 
vice president and COO of CableLabs, gained the trust of participants by chairing the 
MPEG intellectual property working group. Solutions other than a patent pool were 
considered, such as a trade association that would function as a clearinghouse. But patent 
holders wanted to ensure that their intellectual property would be aggressively marketed 
and thus rejected such an association. As a result, CableLabs and other licensors injected 
$3 million to found a corporation, MPEG LA, which handled licensing MPEG-2 patents. 
 
Forming the MPEG-2 patent pool and convincing companies to join the pool was 
complicated due to the different incentives among pool members. These heterogeneous 
incentives, as well as antitrust considerations, shaped the critical features of the pool. 
 
The most debated issue was the licensing rate that MPEG LA would charge 
licensees. The primary motive for certain companies was not to maximize licensing 
revenues, but rather to accelerate the adoption of the standard.  For instance, while Sony 
is both a licensor and licensee of MPEG-2 patents, Sony focuses on maximizing sales of 
its electronics products and pursues patents as a “defensive mechanism” to protect its 
intellectually property.   
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By way of contrast, other organizations such as Lucent and Columbia University 
wanted to maximize the licensing revenues they received from their MPEG-2 patents.  
Columbia was particularly motivated to see the pool succeed due to its fears that if a pool 
were not formed, then MPEG-2 patents would largely be shared via royalty-free cross-
licensing agreements. Since the university did not stand to gain by being offered a license 
to another firm’s technology, in the absence of a pool Columbia would be put in the 
unenviable position of demanding license payments in an environment where no other 
cash payments were being made for MPEG-2 licenses.  Thus, Columbia’s ability to 
demand a relatively high royalty rate was balanced by its need to ensure that a patent pool 
emerged. 
 
On the other hand, Lucent’s bargaining position with the MPEG-2 pool was quite 
different. Lucent had a large internal licensing department with sufficient resources to 
conduct its own MPEG-2 licensing activities. Moreover, Lucent believed that two of its 
patents were most critical to the MPEG standard.  Lucent felt that the licensing rate 
established by MPEG LA was lower than it could have been and decided not to join the 
pool.
20  Lucent estimated that the higher royalty rates it would be able to charge by not 
joining the pool would more than offset the decreased fraction of the MPEG-2 market 
that would license its technology if it pursued its own licensing activities.
21 
                                                 
20Lucent was also constrained by licensing policies that were established as part of a 1956 
consent decree settling federal antitrust litigation against Western Electric. 
 
21So far, this has not been the case, as MPEG-2 licensees generally have been willing to 
pay Lucent no more than the per-patent rate charged by MPEG LA for licenses under 
Lucent’s MPEG-2 patents.  The failure of Lucent to reap attractive returns from its “hold 
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The final licensing rate set by the pool was $4 per decoder for each MPEG-2 
system.  This “one size fits all” strategy led to problems in some markets. In some cases, 
licensees already had licenses to some of the MPEG-2 patents based on broad licensing 
agreements they had with MPEG LA member firms. In such cases, the licensees have 
demanded that the rates they are charged be reduced.  MPEG LA has handled such 
situations by telling these firms to negotiate concessions with the individual firms 
involved in the previous licensing agreements rather than altering the standard MPEG LA 
licensing terms. A bigger problem has occurred in using the same terms for firms in 
different industries. Computer companies have been reluctant to pay these rates, due to 
the computer industry norm of not paying royalties and due to the number of features 
embodied in computers that do not relate to MPEG-2. This led seven MPEG LA pool 
members to initiate infringement litigation against Compaq and Dell. 
 
Additional clauses in the MPEG LA license agreement were designed to make 
MPEG-2 licensees comfortable in adopting the technology. The MPEG LA license grants 
licenses under the future MPEG-2 essential patents of pool members at no additional 
charge. This provision was viewed as a way to allay the fears of potential licensees that 
they would be subject to a hold-up problem if and when new MPEG-2 patents surfaced. 
The MPEG LA license also commits to not raising the royalty rate unless extreme 
                                                                                                                                                 
out” strategy may appear initially puzzling.  The seller of a complementary good should 
be able to charge more when other firms cut their prices.  Industry observers, however, 
argued that substantial uncertainty surrounded the determination of the proper royalty 
rate for patents.  MPEG LA’s decision to set a low rate may have been seen as a signal of 
the patents’ value, leading to a reduced willingness to license Lucent’s complementary 
patents at a high rate.  
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 conditions arise. This clause is also intended to make potential licensees comfortable with 
committing to use MPEG-2 in their products without the worry of being charged 
excessively high licensing rates in the future.
22 
 
The commitment not to raise royalty rates, however, also impacts the ability of 
the pool to attract new licensors. When a new licensor enters the pool, as any essential 
MPEG-2 patent holder may do, each existing licensor is diluted: the formula used by the 
pool for royalty distribution calls for each licensor to receive a pro rata share of the 
licensing revenues (based on the number of essential patents it owns) while the rate 
charged to licensees remains constant.  This formula was seen as the only feasible 
formula to avoid controversies regarding assigning value to each individual patent.  
 
The influence of antitrust concerns necessitated that (a) licensors would not be 
precluded from offering licenses under their individual patents, (b) pool membership 
would be open to any firm with essential MPEG-2 patents, and (c) only “essential” 
patents (as determined by outside counsel) would be included.  In other respects, 
however, the pool was somewhat user unfriendly.  For instance, licensees were required 
to grant back the patents on any innovations that are essential to MPEG-2.  One possible 
rationale was that while pool members made important concessions to the Department of 
Justice, in other areas they felt free to even the balance. 
 
 
                                                 
22In point of fact, the royalty rate has subsequently been lowered to $2.50, even as the 
number of patent families covered by the pool has expanded from 25 to 118. 
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 7. Conclusions 
This paper empirically examines the structure and impact of patent pools.  These 
complex organizations have been little studied, despite their inherent interest on both 
theoretical and practical grounds.  We suggest that the changing features of these 
arrangements over time and across different circumstances—as well as the performance 
of recent pools—are in many respects consistent with theory. 
 
At the same time, the final section, which examined a particular pool in detail, has 
highlighted some issues that we did not address here.  For instance, the importance of 
insuring equitable treatment across pool members and the apparent signaling role that the 
terms of the MPEG license played are not issues addressed in our theoretical framework.  
These questions would certainly deserve further exploration.   
 
Another set of unexplored issues relate to the generality of the patterns seen here.  
As noted in the first paragraph of this paper, joint marketing arrangements are seen in 
many industries, and many of these arrangements are similar to those posed here.
23   
Exploring the nature of and rationales for these arrangements appears to be a promising 
area for future researchers. 
                                                 
23The mapping is, of course, not exact.  For instance, in airline code-sharing 
arrangements, an analogy to “innovation friendliness” is the extent to which the 
agreement encourages the introduction of new routes.  An analogy to “centralized control 
of litigation” is the degree to which decisions over key assets are jointly managed. 
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 Table 1: The sample of patent pools.   The table presents information on the 63 pools analyzed in the paper, including the year in which the pool was formed, the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) that most closely describes the pool’s subject matter, the number of members initially included in the pool, the nationalities of 
the entities initially in the pool, and the manner in which the pool agreement(s) were located.  
 
Pool Subject Matter  Year of  Closest  Initial Pool  Nations  Source of 
Formation  SIC Code     Membership Represented Contract
Pneumatic Straw Stackers  1895  3523  3  U.S.  NAR 
Duplicating Machines  1912  3579  2  U.S.  NAR 
Automobiles 1915 3711 146  U.S. USC
Railroad Couplers  1916  3743  6  U.S.  NAR 
Aircraft 1917 3721 8  U.S.  USC
Braking Systems  1924  3714  2  U.S.  NAR 
Plate Glass  1924  3211  4  U.S.  NAR 
Sand-Spun Pipe  1924  3321  7  U.S.  NADC 
  Dyestuffs 1925 2865 11  Ger.; U.S.  USC
Magnesium 1927 3339 2  U.S.  USC
Metal Dies  1928  3544  2  Ger.; U.S.  USC 
Cast Iron Pipe  1929  3321  4  U.S.  NADC 
Coated Abrasives  1929  3291  9  U.S.  NAR 
Petroleum Refining-JASCO  1929  2911  4  Ger.; U.S.  USC 
Petroleum Refining-Hydro Patents  1930  2911  4  Ger.; U.S.  USC 
Water Conditioning Apparatus  1930  3589  3  Ger.; U.K.; U.S.  NAR 
Grinding Hobs  1931  3545  3  U.S.  NAR 
Magnesium Alloys  1931  3339  2  Ger.; U.S.  USC 
Rail Joint Bars  1931  3312  3  U.S.  NAR 
Railroad Springs  1932  3493  3  U.S.  NAR 
Hydraulic Oil Pumps  1933  3561  3  U.S.  NADC 
Machine Tools  1933  3541  4  U.S.  NAR 
Petroleum Refining-Gray Processes Co.  1933  2911  5  U.S.  USC 
Petroleum Refining-JUIK Group  1933  2911  5  U.S.  USC 
Phillips Screws  1933  3452  2  U.S.  NAR 
Television/Radio Apparatus-Australia 
 
1933  3651  2  Australia  NAR 
Beryllium 1934 3339 3  Ger.; U.S.  USC
Electrical Equipment  1934  3600  3  Ger.; U.S.  NAR 
Lecithin 1934 2070 5  Den.; Ger.; U.S.   NAR
Petroleum Refining-Fractional Distillation 1934 2911 5 U.S. USC
Polymeric Acrylic Acid  1934  2821  2  Ger.; U.S.  USC 
Variable Condensers  1934  3629  3  U.S.  NAR 
Acrylic Acid For Laminated Glass (Plexigum)  1935  3229  2  U.S.  NAR 
Dyestuffs   1935  2865  5  Switz.; U.S.  USC 
Petroleum Refining-Gas Polymerization  1935  2911  5  U.S.  USC 
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 General Chemical  1936  2800  3  Can.; U.K.; U.S.  USC 
Male Hormones  1937  2833  4  Ger.; Switz.; U.S.  NAR 
Wrinkle Finishes  1937  3582  2  U.S.  NAR 
Dropout Cutouts  1938  3643  2  U.S.  NAR 
Inductive Heat Treatment  1938         
         
         
3547 2 U.S. NAR
Opthalmic Frames  1938  3851  2  U.S.  NAR 
Petroleum Refining-Hydrocarbon  1938  2911  5  Ger.; U.S.  USC 
Pour Depressants  1938  2911  3  U.S.  NAR 
Slip Covers  1938  2221  3  U.S.  NADC 
Petroleum Refining-Alkylation  1939  2911  4  U.K.; U.S.  USC 
Dyestuffs 1940 2865 3  U.K.; U.S.  USC
Television Equipment  1942  3651  3  U.S.  NAR 
Television/Radio Apparatus-Canada  1943  3651  4  Can.; U.S.  NAR 
Alginate (Dental) Impression Powder  1947  3843  3  U.S.  NADC 
Plastic Artificial Eyes  1948  3842  2  U.S.  NAR 
Television/Radio Apparatus-Great Britain  1948  3651  5  Neth.; U.K.  NAR 
Tractor Cabs  1948  3537  3  U.S.  NAR 
Daylight Fluorescent Pigments  1949  2816  4  U.S.  NADC 
Glass Fibers  1956  3229  3  Jap.; U.S.  NAR 
Sewing Machines  1956  3639  3  It.; Swed.; U.S.  NAR 
Laser Eye Surgery  1992  3845  2  U.S.  FTCFOIA 
MPEG-2 Digital Video  1997  3652  8  Jap.; Neth.; U.S.  DOJFOIA 
DVD-ROM, DVD-Video  1998  3652  3  Jap.; Neth.  DOJFOIA 
Wireless Personal Area Networking-Bluetooth  1998  3663  9  Fin.; Jap.; Swed.; U.S.  POOL 
1394 Digital Data Transfer Interface  1999 3577 6 Japan;  Neth.;  U.S. POOL
DVB-T - Digital Broadcasting  1999  3663  4  Fr.; Jap.; Neth.  POOL 
DVD-ROM, DVD-Video  1999  3652  6  Jap.; U.S.  DOJFOIA 
3G-Mobile Communications  2001  3663  19  Fin.; Fr.; Ger.; It.; Jap.; Neth.; S.K.   POOL 
 
Notes:  Standard Industrial Codes ending with one or more zeros indicate that the pool covered multiple subclasses within a given classification. 
 
National abbreviations: Can. = Canada; Den. = Denmark ; Fin. = Finland; Fr. = France; Ger.= Germany; It. = Italy; Jap. = Japan; Neth. = The Netherlands ; S.K. = 
South Korea; Swed. = Sweden; Switz. = Switzerland; U.K. = United Kingdom ; U.S. = United States. 
 
Source abbreviations: DOJFOIA = U.S. Department of Justice Freedom of Information Act request; FTCFOIA = U.S. Federal Trade Commission Freedom of 
Information Act request; NADC = U.S. Department of Justice files in the National Archives (Suitland, Maryland); NAR=District court docket files in the regional 
facilities of the National Archives (Boston; Chicago; Kansas City; and New York City); POOL = provided directly by patent pool administrator; USC = published 
hearings or unpublished files of the U.S. congressional investigations. 
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 Table 2: Summary of characteristics of patent pools.  The table presents summary information on a variety of features of the sample of 63 patent pools.  
Medians and standard deviations are not reported for dummy variables. 
 
  Mean          Median Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum
Year signed  1942  1934  24  1895  2001 
Number of initial members in pool  4.54  3  4.85  2  36 
Number of nations initially represented in pool  1.67  1  1.03  1  7 
Must patents be transferred to the pool?  0.25      0  1 
Are future patents automatically assigned to the pool?  0.73      0  1 
Must know-how also be transferred to other pool members?  0.35      0  1 
Do pool members use the patents in the pool?  0.98      0  1 
Do all pool members have relevant patents?  0.75      0  1 
Are cash transfers required as part of joining pool?  0.13      0  1 
Can pool members use all patents on a royalty-free basis?  0.24      0  1 
Are licensing proceeds split equally between pool members?  0.23      0  1 
Are patents licensed to third parties?  0.67      0  1 
Can other parties join the pool?  0.19      0  1 
Can individual pool members license the patents?  0.44      0  1 
Are patents licensed to third parties on “most favored nation” basis?
 a           
           
           
           
           
0.52 0 1
Must third party licensees “grant back” patents on future discoveries?
 a 0.52 0 1
Do third party licensees face menu of license types?
 a 0.14 0 1
Is the royalty rate charged third parties fixed in the pool agreement?
 a 0.33 0 1
Is the per unit rate charged third parties fixed in the pool agreement? 
a 0.45 0 1
 
aOnly computed for those pools where third party licenses are offered. 
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 Table 3: The prevalence of terms of patent pools.  The table presents four critical terms that that affect the workings of patent pools: the stipulations that pool 
members can offer licenses independent of those offered by the pool, that the control of the litigation process is centralized, that licenses are granted to third 
parties, and that pool members need not assign to the pool all future related patents.  In each case, the characteristics of the pools are presented for pools that did 
or did not have this requirement.  The characteristics examined are whether the agreement is signed before 1945, whether the agreement is signed in 1995 or 
after, the count of firms originally in the patent pool, and the growth of patenting in the industry segment of the pool in the five years prior to the formation of the 
pool.  In each case, the first line presents the mean of each measure and the t-test of the null hypothesis that these two populations are identical; and the second 
line, the median and the associated Wilcoxon test.   (For the univariate values, a Pearson χ
2-statistic is presented.)  Asterisks denote cases where the differences 
are statistically significant.  The final row presents the mean frequency of the term in the sample. 
 
   Pool members    Centralized     Licenses     Pool members 
can make    control of    granted  to     need not transfer 
Test  own licenses
     patent litigation?        
 
third  parties? patents  to  pool?
Reported Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Agreement before 1945?  χ
2-test  64%                   
                   
**86% 85% **58% 69% *90% 72% 88%
Agreement after 1994?   χ
2-test  25% ***0% 6% *21% 14% 5% 15% 0%
Count of pool   t-test  5.8  *3.6    4.6  4.6    3.9  5.9    4.8  4.1 
   members  Wilcoxon  4  *3    3  3    3  3    3  4 
Five-year growth,   t-test  67%  51%    54%  66%  57%  60%    67%  33% 
   pool industry patenting  Wilcoxon  52%  26%    30%  36%  26%  64%    48%  15% 
Mean for sample    44%    25%    66%    75% 
  
 
          
 
* Statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 
** Statistically significant at 5% confidence level. 
*** Statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
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 Table 4: Regression analysis of the determinants of patent pool structure.   The table presents a generalized method of moments estimation of a system of 
equations.  The sample consists of 56 patent pools formed between 1895 and 1994. The dependent variables are as follows: qualitative variables denoting 
whether the pool allowed independent licenses, whether the control of litigation was centralized, whether patents were licensed by the pool to third parties, and 
whether the terms of the pool were innovation friendly, and a latent variable measuring whether the patents in the pool were substitutes (constrained to fall 
between zero and one, with one denoting cases where they were substitutes).  The independent variables include the count of firms originally in the patent pool 
(top-coded as 6), the growth of patenting in the industry segment of the pool in the five years prior to the formation of the pool, dummy variables denoting pools 
formed before 1945, where members use the patents on a royalty-free basis, and not among those identified by Gilbert [2002] as displaying anti-competitive 
behavior, and various dependent variables. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
 
  Dependent Variable: 
  Are Independent  Is Control of Litigation  Are Patent Licensed  Is Pool Innovation  Are Patents 
 Licenses Allowed?    Centralized? To  Third  Parties? Friendly? Substitutes? 
Count of firms in pool  0.29  **[0.14]  0.25  *[0.14]  0.33  **[0.14]         
Are patents substitutes?  -1.48  *[0.77]      -0.25  [0.89] 
 
       
Count of firms * Third party licensing * 
No independent licensing 
 
                
                
               
            
               
                 
       
-0.13 [0.14]
Independent  licensing -1.20 [0.93]
Substitutes * Independent licensing      0.36  [0.98]             
Patents licensed to 3
rd  parties?   0.13  [0.40]
Complements * 3
rd party licensing              0.41  [1.34]     
Growth of patenting in the industry 
 




   
Pool  formed  before  1945?   0.18 [0.26]
Members use royalty-free and don’t 
license to others? 
  0.16 [0.10]
Not  problematic  case  (Gilbert  [2002])
 
  -0.66 *[0.38]
  Constant 0.06 [0.73] 0.14 [0.58]  [0.80] -0.17  0.80   **[0.40]   0.66
a 
    Log likelihood  -171.05                 
 
    Number of observations  51                 
 
   
 
*=Significant at the 10% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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  Table 5: Comparison of patents included in recent pools with matching patents.  The sample consists of 174 patents that were included in five patent pools 
formed in 1995 and after along with 347 matching patents. The patents are compared according to several measures of technological and economic significance 
that Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] refer to as patent importance, originality, generality, and scope. The first four columns present means of the various 
measures [medians in brackets] for the set of patents that were included in pools and for two sets of matching patents. The first of these sets labeled “Matching 
Patents by Firm and Class” contains two matching patents for each pooled patent. The first of these matching patents was chosen as the most proximate patent 
awarded to the same firm. The second of these matching patents was chosen as the most proximate patent awarded within the same main USPTO technology 
class and to the same type of assignee. The matching set used in the third and fourth column consists of the two sub-sets of matching patents.  p-values from t-
tests and Wilcoxon tests of the null hypotheses that the two samples have the same means and medians are presented in the fifth and sixth columns respectively. 
 
Panel A: Importance   
  Pooled 
Patents 
Matching 










p-Value from Wilcoxon 
Median Test 
Citations/year received before pool formation  1.6 [0.9]  0.8 [0.4]      
         
      
        
           
          
0.000 0.000
Citations/year received before pool formation  1.6 [0.9] 0.8  [0.3]
 
0.000 0.000
Citations/year received before pool formation  1.6 [0.9]   0.7 [0.4] 0.000 0.000
Citations/year received after pool formation  2.5 [0.9] 
 
1.3 [0.3] 0.001 0.000
Citations/year received after pool formation 2.5 [0.9] 1.3  [0.3]
 
0.016 0.000
Citations/year received after pool formation 2.5 [0.9]   1.3 [0.3] 0.007 0.001
Panel B: Originality 
  Pooled 
Patents 
Matching 










p-Value from Wilcoxon 
Median Test 
Originality measure  0.38 [0.44]  0.38 [0.44]      0.863  0.711 
Originality measure  0.38 [0.44]    0.37 [0.44]    0.809  0.619 
Originality measure  0.38 [0.44]      0.38 [0.44]  0.953  0.884 
Panel C: Generality 
  Pooled 
Patents 
Matching 










p-Value from Wilcoxon 
Median Test
Generality measure  0.42 [0.48]  0.33 [0.40]      0.005  0.004 
Generality measure  0.42 [0.48]    0.34 [0.44]    0.023  0.019 
Generality measure  0.42 [0.48]      0.33 [0.38]  0.012  0.010 
Panel D: Scope   
  Pooled 
Patents 
Matching 










p-Value from Wilcoxon 
Median Test
Number of claims made  16.1 [13]  15.2 [11]      0.525  0.058 
Number of claims made  16.1 [13]    14.2 [10]    0.171  0.057 
Number of claims made  16.1 [13]      16.1 [12]  0.984  0.170 
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 Table 6: Regression analysis of citations to patents included in recent patent pools. The sample consists of 174 
patents that were included in five patent pools formed in 1995 and after along with 347 matching patents that were 
selected based on grant date and belonging to the same USPTO patent class and being assigned to the same firm as 
the pooled patents.  The dependent variables consist of the number of patent citations in each year, whether before or 
after the award.  In Panel A, the sample includes the pooled patents, as well as the full set of 347 matching patents 
that were chosen based on assignee and class.  Panel B includes the pooled patents as well as the matching set of 
patents selected based on assignee.  Panel C includes the pooled patents as well as the matching set of patents 
selected based on patent class.  Independent variables include a dummy variable indicating whether the patent was 
included in a pool, whether the observation was after the formation of the pool, the year the patent was awarded, the 
years since the award of the patent, and either the patent grouping (including the patent and its matches) or the 
individual patent. (Only the first two dummies are reported.)  In each panel, the first regression employs an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) specification, the second two, a negative binomial specification. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. 
 
Panel A: Matched Sample includes Matches by Firm and Matches by Class 
 Specification: 
  OLS  Negative Binomial  Negative Binomial 
Was patent included in pool?  0.86  ***[0.11]  0.71  ***[0.06]     
Patent in pool and after pool formed?  1.19  ***[0.18]  0.19  ** [0.09]  0.25  ***[0.07] 
Dummies for award year and vintage?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Dummies for patent groupings?  Yes    Yes    No   
Dummies for individual patents?  No    No    Yes   
          
p-Value  0.000   0.000   0.000   
R
2 0.35           
Number of observations  3,020    3,020    3,020   
Panel B: Matched Sample includes Matches by Firm Only 
 Specification: 
  OLS  Negative Binomial  Negative Binomial 
Was patent included in pool?  0.91  ***[0.13]  0.83  ***[0.07]   
Patent in pool and after pool formed?  1.11  ***[0.21]  0.15  [0.10]  0.27  ***[0.08] 
Dummies for award year and vintage?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Dummies for patent groupings?  Yes    Yes    No   
Dummies for individual patents?  No    No    Yes   
        
p-Value  0.000   0.000   0.000   
R
2 0.40         
Number of observations  2,014    2,014    2,014   
Panel C: Matched Sample includes Matches by Class Only 
 Specification: 
  OLS  Negative Binomial  Negative Binomial 
Was patent included in pool?  0.83  ***[0.13]  0.64  ***[0.07]   
Patent in pool and after pool formed?  1.14  ***[0.21]  0.16  *[0.10]  0.14  *[0.08] 
Dummies for award year and vintage?  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Dummies for patent groupings?  Yes    Yes    No   
Dummies for individual patents?  No    No    Yes   
        
p-Value  0.000   0.000   0.000   
R
2 0.38         
Number of observations  2,009    2,009    2,009   
 
* Statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 
** Statistically significant at 5% confidence level. 
*** Statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
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 Table 7: Ordinary least squares regression analysis of patent significance for patents included in recent 
patent pools. The sample consists of 174 patents that were included in five patent pools formed in 1995 and after 
along with 347 matching patents that were selected based on grant date and belonging to the same USPTO patent 
class and being assigned to the same firm as the pooled patents.  The dependent variables consist of several 
measures of technological and economic value which Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] refer to as patent 
originality, generality, and scope. In Panel A, the sample includes the pooled patents, as well as the full set of 347 
matching patents that were chosen based on assignee and class.  Panel B includes the pooled patents as well as the 
matching set of patents selected based on assignee.  Panel C includes the pooled patents as well as the matching set 
of patents selected based on patent class.  Independent variables include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
patent was included in a pool, as well as dummy variables (not reported) that control for the year the patent was 
awarded, the pool to which the patent belongs (in the case of matching patents, this is the pool of the corresponding 
patent that was included in a pool), and the patent category as defined by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001]. All 
regressions employ an ordinary least squares specification. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Matched Sample includes Matches by Firm and Matches by Class 
 Dependent  Variable: 
  Originality Generality  Claims 
Was patent included in pool?  0.008  [0.024] 0.082  ***[0.027]  0.853  [1.424] 
          
p-Value 0.002  0.000    0.438   
R
2 0.096  0.187    0.048   
Number of observations  518  433    505   
Panel B: Matched Sample includes Matches by Firm Only 
 Dependent  Variable: 
  Originality Generality  Claims 
Was patent included in pool?  0.013  [0.028] 0.074  **[0.033]  1.891  [1.363] 
          
p-Value 0.007  0.000    0.216   
R
2 0.129  0.212    0.086   
Number of observations  345  287    336   
Panel C: Matched Sample includes Matches by Class Only 
 Dependent  Variable: 
  Originality Generality  Claims 
Was patent included in pool?  0.005  [0.028] 0.089  **[0.031]  -0.066  [1.757] 
          
p-Value 0.003  0.000    0.672   
R
2 0.124  0.199    0.053   
Number of observations  347  300    337   
 
* Statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 
** Statistically significant at 5% confidence level. 
*** Statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
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Figure 1: Citation rate for pool and matching patents relative to award date.  The sample consists of 174 patents that were included in five patent pools 
formed in 1995 and after along with 347 matching patents that were selected based on grant date and belonging to the same USPTO patent class and being 
assigned to the same firm as the pooled patents.  The figure presents the mean number of citations per patent for each year after the award (the calendar year of 
the patent award is designated as year 0, and so forth).  Because there are few seasoned patents in the sample, the final observation includes awards from year 13 
and afterwards. 
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Figure 2: Citation rate for pool and matching patents relative to pool formation date.  The sample consists of 174 patents that were included in five patent 
pools formed in 1995 and after along with 347 matching patents that were selected based on grant date and belonging to the same USPTO patent class and being 
assigned to the same firm as the pooled patents.  The figure presents the mean number of citations per patent for each year before and after the formation of the 
pool (the calendar year of the pool’s formation is designated as year 0, and so forth).   